International Intervention and Cold War Politics
This chapter covers the period from 1964 to 1967, during which the Cyprus crisis became internationalized through UN peacekeeping, Cold War diplomacy, and repeated threats of Greek-Turkish war. The establishment of UNFICYP, the Johnson Letter, failed diplomatic plans, and the Kophinou crisis defined a period in which external powers shaped the trajectory of the Cyprus problem while both communities experienced deepening separation.
Economic Isolation of Turkish Cypriots Begins
Following the intercommunal violence and UN Security Council Resolution 186 of March 1964, Turkish Cypriots face growing economic isolation as the Republic of Cyprus government (now controlled solely by Greek Cypriots) asserts exclusive authority over the island's trade and international relations. The isolation intensifies after the 1974 division and the 1983 TRNC declaration, which is recognized only by Turkey. The 1994 European Court of Justice Anastasiou ruling effectively closes EU markets to northern Cyprus exports. The embargo encompasses direct flights (Ercan Airport is blocked from international routes), mail (routed through Turkey via Mersin 10), phone lines (operating under Turkey's country code), sports (athletes cannot compete under a northern Cyprus flag), and banking. Despite EU pledges after the 2004 referendum to ease isolation, the Republic of Cyprus blocks implementation of a direct trade regulation.
Johnson Letter Warns Turkey Against Invasion
US President Lyndon Johnson sends letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu warning against a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, stating NATO would not be obligated to aid Turkey if the invasion led to conflict with the Soviet Union. The Johnson Letter becomes a watershed moment in Turkish foreign policy, fundamentally shaking Turkish trust in NATO and driving Turkey toward more independent foreign policy.
British naval intelligence officer Martin Packard, engaged in mediation efforts, achieves an agreement for a Turkish Cypriot resettlement program with approval from all political leaders. The effort collapses in mid-June when Packard is removed from the island. Packard later submits a 250-page peace report to the Commonwealth Relations Office, which is embargoed by Whitehall.
US envoy Dean Acheson proposes two plans for Cyprus: Plan I (July) envisions union with Greece, Turkish Cypriot autonomous cantons, and a Turkish sovereign military base; Plan II (August) offers Turkey a 50-year lease on a smaller, non-sovereign base. Both plans are rejected by Makarios; Greece finds them politically unfeasible; Turkey rejects Plan II.
Greek Cypriots Take Sole Government Control
Turkish Cypriot officials, displaced from government buildings since the violence of December 1963, are unable to return to their posts. Greek Cypriots assume sole control of the Republic's government. Turkish Cypriots maintain that the government operating without their constitutionally mandated participation is illegitimate. Makarios establishes a Greek Cypriot National Guard with officers covertly transferred from Greece.
Major hostilities end. According to UN reports and communal records, total casualties from the 1963-1964 conflict period are estimated at approximately 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots killed, though figures vary across sources. Approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots (a quarter of their population) flee their homes from 104 villages.
Turkish Cypriots Confined to Enclaves
Following the intercommunal violence, Turkish Cypriots are confined to enclaves comprising roughly 3% of the island's territory. Greek Cypriot authorities impose restrictions on movement of goods, building materials, and essential supplies into the enclaves. UN reports and Red Cross records document significant economic hardship. These conditions persist until 1974.